My second book will be published by Lynne Rienner Publishers in August 2026.

Since the 1990s, the use of economic sanctions by the United States has expanded greatly, becoming a central tool of statecraft. In response, both targeted states and third parties have developed increasingly sophisticated forms of “smart evasion.” In this book, I advance a theory of institutionalized sanctions resistance.

I show how states embed resistance within formal legal and administrative systems. Governments construct durable mechanisms that mitigate and reinterpret external economic coercion, transforming ad hoc responses into patterned forms of resistance.

I argue that the global financial system creates a constrained environment where direct confrontation is costly and often futile. States deploy “weapons of the weak” using incremental, legally grounded strategies that attempt to complicate sanctions enforcement and reshape how sanctions are applied and contested.

For a short time, the book is on sale! Pre-order your copy today!

My first book with Charmaine N. Willis Ward (2024), Trading with Pariahs: Trade Networks and the Failure of Economic Sanctions, examines the the impact of economic sanctions on target states' trading relationships.

Our research seeks to examine under what conditions do sanctions fail to change the behavior of so-called international “pariah states,” countries who violate various international norms. Drawing on UN Comtrade data, Trading with Pariahs: Trade Networks and the Failure of Economic Sanctions shows that the imposition of sanctions can drastically change some states’ trading networks, as states either find new trading partners (in the case of North Korea) or feel the sting of the sanctions from key trading partners (like Iran). Trading networks (such as Myanmar’s) remain relatively stable over time as key trading partners refuse to impose sanctions. 

Through the theory of weaponized interdependence, Keith A. Preble and Charmaine N. Willis argue that the success or failure of sanctions to change target states’ behavior depends on whom imposes the sanctions. Sanctions imposed by the “right” sender states can be successful but also cannot rely solely on policies of isolation to achieve the goals of the sanctions.